Free and Unfair: The Hungarian Elections

by EUDO Citizenship Expert András Bozóki

 

Forthcoming article in IWMpost 2014/1, reproduced with permission of The Institute for Human Sciences (IWM), Vienna

Hungary’s parliamentary elections in April saw a 61% turnout, the lowest since 1998. The high abstention rate was a sign of disaffection with Hungarian politics: four-tenths of the electorate believed it was left without a genuine political choice.

Fidesz, the rightwing populist party led by Viktor Orbán, received 45% of the votes, giving it a strong mandate to continue to govern. Thanks to the disproportional voting system introduced by Fidesz, the party retained its two-thirds parliamentary majority. However, of a total of 8 million citizens eligible to vote, only 2.1 million cast their ballot for Fidesz; this was 8% (or 600,000 voters) less than in 2010. Orbán’s description of the new electoral system as the manifestation of “national unity” is therefore clearly implausible. However, Orbán’s charismatic leadership and his anti-European, Christian-nationalist rhetoric have managed to forge an alliance between conservative voters and the lower middle class, which expects the state to halt its existential decline. In 2002 and 2006 – when the previous election system was still in place – this solid, two million-strong voter base didn’t suffice for a Fidesz victory. This time, it secured the party a supermajority.

The alliance of leftist opposition parties came second with 26% of the vote. Led by Attila Mesterházy, the alliance is made up of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Together (Együtt), Dialogue for Hungary (PM), the Democratic Coalition (DK) and the Hungarian Liberal Party (MLP). Since the previous elections, the alliance has managed to increase its vote by nearly 300,000, receiving a total of 1.2 million votes. Nevertheless, its performance at the polls is seen as a crushing defeat. In the last four years, the left has been unable to reinvent itself from the ground up. It has failed to communicate a clear identity or program; its leaders, who are engaged in constant rivalry, decided to field a joint list only at the last minute. The primary message of the alliance was a desire to run Viktor Orbán out of office; it had nothing to offer in terms of a genuine and positive vision. The list was dominated by MSZP politicians, held responsible by voters for the policy failures in the period up to 2010. Following their defeat, the leaders of the coalition parties announced that they would be running separately in the European parliamentary elections in May.

The third place went to far-right party Jobbik, with 20.5% of the vote. This represents some one million voters, 3% (100,000 votes) more than in the previous election. The results for individual constituencies show that in half the country Jobbik beat leftwing candidates. Several newspapers commented that the elections were a great victory for Jobbik, which promotes Hungarian nationalism, radicalism, anti-globalization and racism. Analysts blamed Orbán for the growing support of rightwing extremists and said that Europe could no longer ignore the far-right. In the months before the elections, Jobbik assumed a more moderate tone, campaigning with the slogan of “livelihood, order and accountability” and muting its standard racist message. It not only ran successfully in the poorest, north-eastern region of the country, but also managed to gain new positions in counties in the west. Today, Jobbik is a party with a national presence and the potential to capture the political center.

The green party, Politics Can Be Different (LMP), came last with 5.2% of the vote. Although this falls short of the party’s 2010 performance, it may grant green policies a new lease on life. Keeping an equal distance from both the rightist and the leftist bloc, LMP sent a middle-of-the-road, anti-establishment messages to its voters during the campaign.

The OSCE found that the elections themselves were effective and largely transparent, however cast doubt on the legitimacy of Orban’s landslide victory, commenting on the “undue advantage” enjoyed by Fidesz and the lack of freedom for the opposition during the campaign. The European Parliament, the European Council, the United States, and several EU member states have also openly criticized this abuse. The German government demanding that Orbán observe “fundamental rights” and govern responsibly. The Financial Times leader column suggested that Hungary’s EU partners could not continue to greet each outrage with embarrassed silence.

The act on electoral procedure was passed without meaningful public debate, in violation of both Hungarian and international practice. Constituency boundaries were shifted around to make leftwing districts more populous than rightwing districts, causing a leftwing vote to carry less weight. Different rules apply to Hungarian nationals abroad and so-called “Trianon” Hungarians living beyond state borders. Moreover, under the new system extra mandates are added to the list of the winning party receives, which makes the regulation extremely disproportionate. These rules violate the principle of equal vote. There has also been a failure to properly regulate a number of important areas connected to campaign financing, such as the campaign activities of satellite organizations. Using public funds, Fidesz outsourced part of its campaign to a civic organization with close ties to the party, the Civil Alliance Forum (CÖF). Thanks to new financing regulations, the transparency of the system and its accountability has been compromised.

The Media Council set up by Fidesz is not politically neutral. The acquisition of media companies by investors with close ties to Fidesz undermines the plurality of the media and forces journalists to self-censor. Regulations introduced by Fidesz prohibit commercial television stations from running financed promotions, which did not stop government ads being aired. The majority of television channels broadcast reports that are biased towards Fidesz. Together, these factors grant the government significant and unfair advantages and restrict citizens’ access to proper information. The result has been a loss of public confidence in the electoral system. Not only Fidesz as a party campaigned, as it is usual in any multiparty democracy, but the Fidesz-controlled state administration “campaigned” too by using taxpayers’ money and creating an uneven playing field. The boundaries between party and the state became blurred. This violates the principles about fair competition laid down in OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document.

The lower middle classes and the poor, victims of the discriminative governmental social policies of the past four years, have been compensated with utility-cost cuts. While advertising on utility-cost cuts are delivered regularly to all Hungarian citizens, the burden of special taxes is borne by various segments of the population in isolation. The majority of the public has been convinced by the media that, despite permanent economic stagnation, “Hungary has been performing better” over Fidesz’s four-year term.

Today, the Hungarian public is constantly reminded by its political leaders of the importance of national pride. Individual rights and the democratic institutions that protect them have taken a backseat to constitutionally endorsed policies of collective identity and cultural uniformity. With government propaganda about “order”, “home”, “fatherland” and “family” drowning out all other voices, many are voting with their feet: In the past four years, half a million people have left the country.

 

Read our earlier news on the issue.

Read a commentary on the final election results by Kim Lane Scheppele and her earlier commentaries on the Hungarian franchise politics

Read More …

The Aftermath of Annexation: Russia and Ukraine Adopt Conflicting Rules for Changing Citizenship of Crimean Residents (updated)

By Oxana Shevel (EUDO CITIZENSHIP expert)

Last update 16 April 2014

With Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Ukraine’s non-recognition of the annexation, the question of citizenship status of local residents looms large.  According to article 4 of the Russian law from 23 March 2014 “On the Acceptance of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Creation of New Federal Subjects – the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Significance Sevastopol,” citizens of Ukraine and stateless persons who were permanently residing in Crimea as of March 18 (the date of Crimea’s incorporation into Russia) are recognized as citizens of Russia, unless they declare within one month (so by April 18) their desire to maintain another citizenship or to remain stateless. The same article of this law also states that after one month Russian legislation that limits holders of other citizenship from occupying government and municipal jobs comes in effect in Crimea.  

The explanations of the Ukrainian authorities on the citizenship status of Crimean residents, the process of acquisition of Russian citizenship and the situation of those who do not want to acquire Russian citizenship and want to maintain their Ukrainian citizenship reveal several problematic issues for Crimean residents. The situation, including regulations and practices affecting citizenship matters, is also changing rapidly and conflicting commentaries and explanations come even from government officials.

The Crimean crisis challenged Ukraine’s long-standing policy of non-recognition of multiple citizenship, and the available information shows that the Ukrainian government is treating Crimea as a special case. Ukrainian legislation does not recognize multiple citizenships and voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship is one of the grounds for initiating of a procedure of terminating Ukrainian citizenship. However, Ukrainian officials stated that Ukraine will continue considering Crimean residents, including those who will apply and will be issued Russian passports, as citizens of Ukraine and will guarantee them political and economic rights. Acknowledging that this “to a certain extent” goes against Ukrainian legislation, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers official explained that the case of illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory and “forceful issuance” of passports by Russia are circumstances that warrant an exception. The Ukrainian State Migration Service explained that Ukrainian citizenship can be terminated only after a person who permanently lives abroad (to become such a person under the Ukrainian law is a complex and lengthy procedure) acquires another citizenship and then applies to have his or her Ukrainian citizenship terminated. Citizenship termination comes into effect once the President of Ukraine signs a decree on this matter, so no action by the Russian state can terminate Ukrainian citizenship in the eyes of the Ukrainian state. While this is correct, Ukrainian citizenship law  also contains a provision that allows Ukrainian authorities to initiate citizenship termination procedure in cases when citizen of Ukraine voluntarily acquired a foreign citizenship, but it appears that Ukraine will not be applying this clause to residents of Crimea.

The Ukrainian government already instructed migration service offices throughout mainland Ukraine to accept and process applications from Crimea residents on all passport-related matters, such as applying for a passport for foreign travel, changing the name in the passport, etc under simplified rules. Under Ukrainian law, citizens apply for passport-related formalities to the migration service office at their place of residence, but Crimean residents are now allowed to apply anywhere in mainland Ukraine. The government is also instituting procedures that would allow Crimean residents to vote in Ukrainian presidential elections on 25 May in the Ukrainian regions bordering Crimea. A new law “On upholding rights and freedoms of citizens on the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine” was just adopted by the Ukrainian parliament, which states that the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine has to establish a procedure for paying pensions to Ukrainian citizens in Crimea who do not receive pension payments from Russia. The Ukrainian passport would be also required for Crimeans to obtain Schengen visas. The European Council decided that the EU visa will be issued to residents of Crimea only in embassies/consulates located on the territory of Ukraine and only into Ukrainian passports as the EU does not recognize the annexation of Crimea.

The final version of the law contains a special amendment pertaining to citizenship which was added to the government proposal by the members of the Parliament. According to the stenographic record of the parliamentary debate, MP Volodymyr Ariev from Batkivshchyna party reminded the chamber that Russia set 18 April as the deadline for Ukrainian citizens who are registered as residing in Crimea to submit applications that they do not wish to become Ukrainian citizens, and that after this date Russia will consider all those who did not submit applications as Russian citizens. Ariev argued that this essentially will make many Ukrainian citizens “criminals”, presumably because Ukraine does not recognize multiple citizenship and acquisition of foreign citizenship by a Ukrainian citizen is a ground for the Ukrainian authorities to initiate a procedure to terminate the person’s Ukrainian citizenship. He also stated that he knows of disabled people in his electoral district who are registered as Crimean residents but who cannot travel there to apply to refuse Russian citizenship by the deadline. He therefore tabled an amendment that “Ukraine does not recognize forceful enlistment of its citizens into citizenship of a foreign country.” The amendment was approved on second attempt with 234 votes in favor, together with the amendment that citizens of Ukraine are free to travel to Crimea without obtaining special permission from State Migration Service. The original draft stipulated that citizens of Ukraine, except for those who are registered as residing in Crimea, will need to obtain special permission to travel to the peninsula. 

Russia does not require Ukrainian citizens who apply for Russian citizenship to surrender their Ukrainian passports or to formally relinquish their Ukrainain citizenship although, as the Crimean Prime Minister indicated on 11 April, civil servants and law enforcement officials who wish to keep their jobs will be required to formally relinquish their Ukrainian passports. This conformswith the Russian law since, as noted above, holders of more than one citizenship cannot occupy government jobs in Russia. But under Ukrainian law these people will not be able to relinquish their Ukrainian citizenship even if they wanted  since one has to permanently reside abroad before one can apply to have Ukrainian citizenship terminated.  

Even though from the point of view of the Ukrainian state Ukrainian citizenship of Crimean residents will not be affected by the annexation of Crimea or subsequent actions of the Russian government, including issuance of Russian passports to Crimean residents, Russia will consider as Russian citizens all residents of Crimea who have not formally applied by 18 April not to become Russian citizens. This means, for example, that they will be subject to military service requirements. Ukraine has ended conscription service this year, while in Russia conscription remains in force.  Article 3 of the 23 March Russian law on the acceptance of Crimea into Russia states that residents of Crimea conscripted into the Russian armed forces will serve on the territory of Crimea until the end of 2016. After this date conscripted soldiers can be sent to serve anywhere in Russia, including the turbulent region of North Caucasus, and this prospect is hardly appealing to many parents of Crimean boys.  For some Crimeans, especially those who identify with Ukraine, the question thus arises whether they want to formally refuse Russian citizenship.

Many reports by local residents and activists from Crimea that have appeared in the Ukrainian media and on social networks since Russia annexed the peninsula indicate that Russia is making it difficult to refuse Russian citizenship. In particular, refusal of Russian citizenship is affected by the limited number of places in Crimea where one can formally register such a refusal. The Russian law of 23 March 23 did not specify to what authority the application to maintain current citizenship and not to be attributed Russian citizenship was to be submitted. Local passport offices affiliated with the Ministry of the Interior that in the post-Soviet region traditionally deal with the issuance of passports and residency registration are accepting applications for Russian passports throughout Crimea. According to a Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS) official, as of 8 April, some 80,000 Russian passports were issued to Crimean residents, at a rate of 13,000 a day, and 150,000 applications for Russian passports have been received. One can apply for a Russian passport in about 160 such offices in Crimea, and those who have Crimean registration but are presently outside Crimea can apply for Russian citizenship at a branch of the Russian FMS anywhere in the world, according to the FMS. At the same time, until 11 April, the FMS accepted applications from those who do not wish to become Russian citizens only in four offices in Crimea, three of which are located in and around the regional capital Simferopol and one more in Sevastopol. This means that people living elsewhere in Crimea had to travel potentially over long distances to submit applications, while those who live outside Crimea were not able to apply at all.There is conflicting information on whether Russian embassies and consulates are accepting such applications. On 11 April, FMS in Crimea reported on its Facebook page that it will be immediately opening five more offices in other towns in Crimea, where one can apply to refuse Russian citizenship. At the same time, according to a local blogger and activist, FMS stopped accepting applications sent by registered mail that it was reported to have accepted previously. The mail-in route was actively discussed on social media as it affects those who are formally registered as living in Crimea who in fact have been living, working, or studying elsewhere – in mainland Ukraine or abroad. The registered mail route was considered risky since there are no guarantees that the application will be duly registered or even delivered since the rapid takeover of Crimea by Russia and Ukraine’s non-recognition of the annexation also affected mail service and FMS officials also discouraged it.

According to the data provided by the FMS, as of April 7 only 16 people in Crimea submitted applications to refuse Russian citizenship, but other sources indicate that the number are much higher, and furthermore that not all those wishing to apply may be able to do so by the deadline. This report, for example, contains a video filmed inside one of the four offices where applications can be submitted. A person in the video says that she is number 186 in line, and that this is not the first day she has been coming and the line is too long for her to get in. Long lines beyond daily capacity of each of the four offices are confirmed by other local residents and the media. The maximum capacity of each of the four offices which is estimated to be around 70, possibly up to 100, people a day, according to local activists who have gone through the process themselves and are now helping guide others.  Given that lines are extending to several days, it’s possible that not all those who wish to refuse Russian citizenship will be able to do so by April 18 deadline. If five more offices indeed open from April 11 it would meet more of the demand, but it remains to be seen if all of the demand will be met during the one remaining week.

On social networks people speculate that Russia may have purposefully limited the number of offices to ensure that, given the daily capacity of each office, the number of people who will be able to refuse Russian citizenship in the course of four weeks will not exceed 3% of the Crimean residents, thus approximating official referendum results (according to the official results, 96.77% of Crimean residents voted in March 16 referendum for Crimea to join Russia; the population of Crimea is 2.35 million). On April 9 Ukrainian Justice Minister stated that Ukrainian government also believes that Russia is purposefully creating obstacles for Crimeans who do not wish to become Russian citizens, and that Ukraine is collecting facts to this effect and will add them as evidence for prospective claims against Russia in the European Court of Human Rights.

Decision not to become citizen of Russia in the annexed Crimea is costly – literally and figuratively. According to one FMS official, Russian passports are issued for free until 1 January 2015, and afterwards the price will be 200 rubles (later FMS stated that Russian passports will continue to be free indefinitely), while those who apply not to become Russian citizens will have to apply for Russian permanent residency permits (vid na zhitelstvo) and pay 2,000 ruble fee for it. There is conflicting information as to whether permanent residency permits will be issued automatically to all those who permanently resided in Crimea as of March 18, or whether people will need to undergo a procedure foreigners undergo in Russia before they can acquire permanent residency permit, which involves first getting temporary residency permit and after living with it for half a year applying for permanent residency permit. According to one FMS official, no documents beyond personal application and 2,000 rubles fee will be required from Ukrainian citizens who permanently resided in Crimea as of March 18 to receive Russian permanent residency permit. Another FMS official, however, indicated that Crimeans will first have to acquire temporary residency permit, and then in half a year apply for permanent residency permit and wait another half a year before they can receive it. Yet another FMS official stated that those who refuse Russian citizenship will lose legal status and right to legally be in Crimea on April 19, and therefore will need to leave the territory of the peninsula, then re-enter Russia legally as foreign citizens, register at their place of residence, and only then apply for temporary residency permit. The procedure for applying for temporary residency permits established by the Russian law is complex and requires in documents confirming that the applicant was not convicted by a court before, does not have drug addiction, dangerous infectious diseases, or HIV-AIDS. Most disturbing and most recent information posted on April 11 by a local blogger and citing FMS office in Simferopol as the source is that Crimeans who refuse Russian citizenship need not only to leave and re-enter Crimea for their presence in Crimea to be considered legal after April 19, but that upon re-entry they will be subject to the rule Russia introduced on 1 January 2014 for countries with which it has visa-free travel. This rule is that one cannot stay on the territory of Russia for more than 90 days out of any 180 days. In other words, in order to apply for even temporary residency permit, Crimeans may need to leave Crimean territory twice and spend some time living outside Crimea.

Uncertainty associated with the requirements for registering legal stay in Crimea and the possible loss of rights – potentially even the right to stay in Crimea without leaving and re-entering – if one refuses Russian citizenship, as well as substantial costs associated with getting residency permit as opposed to free Russian citizenship, is likely deterring many Crimeans from refusing Russian citizenship. At the same time, hostile climate towards those with pro-Ukrainian views and forthcoming restrictions on civil and political liberties such as the right of assembly and the ability to criticize the government that are coming to Crimea with the Russian legislation are driving some Crimeans towards leaving the peninsula all together.  According to Ukrainian authorities, by the end of March more than 3,500 people fled Crimea for mainland Ukraine, many of them Crimean Tatars, a Sunni Muslim group that considers Crimea its homeland and that traditionally has been pro-Ukrainian and opposed Russian annexation of Crimea. Acting Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatseniuk stated that Ukraine is ready to welcome and accommodate as many as 23,000 escapees from Crimea.

 

Read more on the key provisions of the law and on the debate in the parliament in Pravda.

While the final version of the law would not be available before the official promulgation, read the drafts and the opinions of the legal department and relevant committees on the website of the parliament  (in Ukrainian).  

 

Read More …

German coalition government approved the draft law which would allow dual citizenship to children of immigrants

German coalition government has adopted the draft amendment to the citizenship law, reflecting the compromise between the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats on the ‘option duty’ reached last month. Second generation immigrants will no longer be required to renounce either the citizenship of their parents, or that of Germany if by the age of 21 they have had either 8 years of residence, or 6 years of compulsory schooling in the country. 

Read more details from Reuters.

Read More …

Malta appears lenient to the residency requirement it was hard-pressed to introduce for its investor-citizenship scheme

The head of Identity Malta – a government agency operating the controversial Individual Investor Program – announced that the applicants are not expected to be present 365 days a year to meet the one-year residency required to obtain Maltese passport. He insisted that the availability of a genuine link will be decided on a case by case basis, but according to observers two visits of the country during the year may be deemed sufficient. 

Read full details in MaltaToday

Read More …

Non-resident votes may tip the balance in Hungarian Parliamentary elections

by EUDO expert Szabolcs Pogonyi

According to the preliminary Parliamentary election results, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party has won the elections and may secure a two-thirds majority for another four years. With 99 percent of the votes counted, Fidesz (44,5 %) is forecasted to win 133 out of 199 seats in Parliament. The left-wing electoral alliance (26 %) is estimated to have 38, the far-right Jobbik (20,5 %) 23, and Can Politics Be Different? (5,3 %) 5 seats. 

As part of a complete overhaul of the constitutional and electoral systems, non-resident Hungarian citizens could vote for the first time. The non-resident constituency is comprised of mostly the 600,000 Hungarians who have acquired citizenship through the Orbán government’s non-resident citizenship framework designed for the inclusion of ethnic Hungarians most of whom are living in the neighboring countries.  Non-resident Hungarians could vote after registration for the party lists but not in single-member districts through mail vote (sent either by post or submitted at embassies). 

In total, 193,793 non-resident voters have registered. Until election day, 146,299 mail votes have been received. Mail votes by non-resident voters could be submitted on election day also at embassies, but the number of these votes have not yet been published. Out of the received votes, so far 110,686 have been processed. As a result of a rather complicated submission process,  only 87,972 voted were valid and as much as 20 percent have been void. Out of the 87,972 validated votes, 62,754 have been counted as of Monday, April 7. Fidesz has received the overwhelming 95,4 percent of these votes, while Jobbik has 2,32 and the left-wing alliance 1,23 percent.

These numbers suggest that the vote from the non-resident constituency may prove decisive in determining whether Fidesz can maintain its two-thirds majority in Parliament. According to the current projection, Fidesz will have 133 seats – exactly the number necessary for an absolute majority. Out of the total 199 seats, 93 are reserved for the party-list representation. In the party list vote, slightly more than 80,000 votes are required to win one seat. It is very likely that the votes from the non-resident constituency will secure one seat for Fidesz, without which it would otherwise have no absolute majority. With two-thirds of seats in Parliament, Fidesz may rewrite any laws including the Basic Law adopted in 2011.

Read an update with the final results by Kim Lane Scheppele. Read her earlier commentaries on the Hungarian franchise politics

 

Read more details about the submission of ex-pat voting in our report on electoral rights by András Bozóki 

Read our earlier news about the constitutional entrenchment of ius sanguinis

Read More …

Russian Duma adopts the amendment for facilitated citizenship for Russian-speakers

On 4 April 2014  the Russian Duma approved an amendment to the Russian citizenship law proposed by the government that allows speakers of the Russian language to get Russian citizenship under simplified rules (a shorter waiting period of 3 months instead of 6 months and no 5 year residency requirement). A commission will be set up to determine whether a person has sufficient language competence to be considered a Russian-speaker. To qualify, Russian-speaking applicants have to relocate to Russia for permanent residency, give up a prior citizenship and must have been themselves (or have direct ancestors) permanently living on the territory of the Russian Federation or “territories belonging to the Russian Empire or USSR, within the borders of the Russian Federation”.

Read more details from ITAR-TASS (in Russian). 

Read More …

Czech minister states that permanent residents should be given the vote

The Human Rights minister of the Czech Republic claimed that foreigners who have long stay permits should be given the right to participate in local elections. Currently, this is possible only for immigrants from other EU member states, but the minister emphasised that it would be in the state’s own interest to do its best to integrate all immigrants.

Read more details in The Prague Post.

Read about the failed attempt at enfranchising foreigners in Bremen.

Read More …