Alíz Nagy (Eötvös Loránd University)
In his recent annual address, Viktor Orbán announced that the Hungarian Fundamental Law is set to be amended, yet again and for the 15th time. On the 12th of March, members of the ruling Fidesz party submitted a proposal for an Amendment to regulate the suspension of Hungarian citizenship of persons who pose a threat to Hungary’s public order or to public or national security. The proposal signals a concerted assault on those who the government perceives as a threat to its power. Notably, in his speech on the 15th of March, which is a National Holiday commemorating the 1848 revolution, the Prime Minister referred to his enemies as ‘bugs’, identifying (opposition) politicians, judges, journalists, civil and political activists.
‘The heady day of 15 March 1848 was followed by the sober and wise laws of April. These laws protected the freedom won on 15 March. This is exactly what will happen now. After today’s festive gathering will come house cleaning for Easter. The bugs have survived winter. We are dismantling the financial machine that has used corrupt dollars to buy politicians, judges, journalists, bogus civil society organisations and political activists. We will disperse the entire shadow army.’
As the Hungarian Helsinki Committee has observed, the proposed Amendment ‘represent a significant escalation in the Government’s efforts to suppress dissent, weaken human rights protection, and consolidate power’. In what follows, I summarise the Hungarian proposal for citizenship suspension and situate it within the broader Hungarian context.
Suspension of Citizenship
The 15th Amendment introduces a new concept: the suspension of citizenship. Article G paragraph (3) of the Fundamental Law was proposed to be changed into:
‘(3) No one shall be deprived of Hungarian citizenship established by birth or acquired in a lawful manner. The citizenship of a Hungarian citizen who is also a citizen of another state, with the exception of a citizen of a state with the right of free movement and residence, may be suspended for a definite period of time, as established by a cardinal Act. Collective suspension is prohibited.’
Subsequently, on the 1st of April, Bill T/11414 was submitted by a Fidesz politician. Accordingly, Hungarian citizenship could be suspended if: the individual also holds the citizenship of a non-EU or non-EEA state and their Hungarian citizenship poses a threat to Hungary’s public order or to public or national security – particularly if the individual:
ba) serves in a foreign army or in the public service of a foreign state;
bb) acts in the interests of foreign power or foreign organization in a manner incompatible with Hungarian citizenship, or implements the objectives of foreign power or foreign organization;
bc) has left the territory of Hungary with the purpose of joining a terrorist organization or terrorist group;
bd) has been convicted by a Hungarian court for committing crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, apartheid, the violent overthrow of the constitutional order, conspiracy against the constitutional order, treason, disloyalty, aiding the enemy, espionage, terrorist acts, or financing terrorism, as expressed in the Penal Code.
The suspension can be ordered by a minister designated in a government decree. The period of suspension extends until the threat persists, with a maximum of 10 years. While anyone can submit a notification requesting the application of this provision, the procedure itself can only be initiated ex officio. The citizen suspended must be notified, but only of the final decision, not of the initiation of the procedure. The citizen will have 30 days to appeal the decision. The final decision must be published in the Official Gazette and must specify the end date of the suspension.
An individual may request the restoration of their citizenship by proving that they no longer pose a threat. However, this request can only be made once during the suspension period. If rejected, 15 days are available for appeal. Some further provisions on restoration are introduced: if the individual loses their third-country citizenship, their Hungarian citizenship may be restored. Furthermore, citizenship will be restored once the predetermined maximum suspension period (10 years) is over.
The proposal also regulates the expulsion of suspended citizens, which is arguably the main instrumental reason behind the introduction of the unprecedented concept of citizenship suspension. However, expulsion is framed as a conditional outcome, with the possibility that individuals who have been suspended may also face expulsion from the state. Nonetheless, it is difficult to envisage a scenario in which the suspension of citizenship would be justified, yet expulsion would not be deemed necessary.
About the Concept of Suspension
Suspension of citizenship is an unknown notion. Péter Szigeti describes it as ‘unprecedented and barely intelligible‘. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee labels the law’ vague and unprecedented’. Furthermore, in their information note about the 15th Amendment, they argue that it ‘creates legal uncertainty, raises serious human rights concerns, and effectively institutionalizes political intimidation.’
International norms provide guidance regarding the loss of citizenship, with the foremost principle being the prevention of statelessness. The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, complemented by the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, outlines the legal framework. Issues of loss, renunciation, or deprivation of citizenship are addressed, and guidelines on avoiding statelessness not only at birth but also later in life are offered. However, the concept of suspension is absent from the language or practice of international law.
The Hungarian proposal stipulates that citizenship may only be suspended if the individual holds additional (third-country) citizenship. Furthermore, it states that should the individual lose ‘its third’ citizenship, the suspended Hungarian one may be restored. These provisions were likely introduced to protect the proposal from allegations of violating international law. In practice, however, the suspension of citizenship could result in de facto statelessness. Szigeti draws on the idea of Schrödinger’s Citizenship, describing it as ‘the most prevalent technique[] for manufacturing‘ statelessness. If the secondary nationality is not recognized as effective, if the ‘genuine link’ principle does not hold, the individual whose Hungarian citizenship has been suspended may find themselves effectively stateless. Furthermore, Article 9 of the 1961 Convention ‘prohibits the deprivation of citizenship “on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds”‘ as also pointed out by Szigeti. Keeping in mind the context in which the new law is being introduced, it appears inherently prejudicial towards anyone who does not support the governing party’s political interests.
Hungary is a signatory to the European Convention on Nationality, which already provides some ground for citizenship deprivation in cases of ‘conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State Party’ (Article 7 (1) (d)). The legislation now appears narrower in scope of suspension than the Convention’s provisions on deprivation. However, since the Hungarian law still includes provisions for citizenship revocation (Act LV of 1993 On Nationality 9§), it can be claimed that the legislation on citizenship revocation aligns with the norms set by the European Convention, as suspension is a different concept, therefore the provisions for revocation do not apply.
It is also worth considering the procedural aspects of the law. Suspension of citizenship is carried out by the decision of the designated minister, but there is no clear information provided regarding the minister’s designation nor any guidelines available on the process they would follow. The minister can seek advice from the National Information Centre, one of Hungary’s national security services, which has already been tasked with gathering information on civil society actors. While there is an opportunity for appeal with a 30-day deadline, it remains ambiguous how the individual, who is at the same time being expelled, would be informed (via post, on the state’s online platform, etc.).
From the early 2000s, when laws permitting denaturalization for national security reasons were introduced, among many other elements, one of the debated issues was the individual’s access to the notification of their own deprivation or revocation of citizenship. A prominent case is that of Shamima Begun, which underscores both the procedural challenges surrounding the deprivation of citizenship and the states’ interpretation of her third-country nationality, revealing the significant difficulties involved in revoking someone’s citizenship.
It can be concluded that the proposal remains vague and highly inconsistent regarding the purposes and objectives of the new notion of suspension. Since it does not provide clear criteria for suspension, it leaves considerable room for the discretion of the designated minister. It leaves open many questions about the process of restoration of citizenship.
Content of Hungarian Citizenship
Finally, the proposal also raises questions about the content of Hungarian citizenship, as it claims that suspension occurs when the threat to national security is incompatible with Hungarian citizenship. According to the proposal, the need for the Amendment arises to ensure that ‘Hungary’s priority is to preserve its identity and ensure that the foundations of its social order continue to serve the interests of communities, including the family and the nation.’ The new codification is framed as a measure to protect the sovereignty of the nation-state, safeguarded through the suspension of citizenship for those who do not embrace the same political and ideological ideals that contribute to the preservation of the nation-state, as envisioned by the governing Fidesz Party.
In accordance with the Prime Minister’s speech on the 15th of March, those individuals’ acting in the interests of and implementing the objectives of a foreign power or foreign organization in a manner incompatible with Hungarian citizenship’ can be seen as ‘bugs’. These individuals are often labelled as servants of Brussels – more specifically, of Manfred Weber – who is the target of a recurring smear campaign in Hungary.
‘They are the latter-day Habsburg troops, the minions of Brussels, paid to do the empire’s bidding against their own country. They have been here too long. They have survived too much. They have received money from too many places. They have switched sides too many times. In 1848, we had the Emperor’s crows on our backs, and now we have Weber chicks squawking over our heads.’
Assuming that few of these individuals possess multiple citizenships, and even fewer are likely to hold a third-country nationality as their second citizenship, only a small portion of this so-called ‘shadow army’ could be targeted through the suspension mechanism.
Ironically, the newly introduced concept of citizenship suspension could specifically target the same individuals living in the diaspora or in Hungary’s non-EU and EEA neighbouring countries, such as Serbia and Ukraine, who were previously targeted by Hungary’s citizenship policy. As a result of Fidesz’ focus on mobilizing transborder Hungarians, both the diaspora population and kin-minorities of neighbouring countries could obtain non-resident citizenship under the legal framework, which applied a more cultural concept of the nation. In 2010, with its first two-thirds majority, the Fidesz government removed the residency requirement from the Act on Nationality, thus enabling transborder Hungarians to obtain Hungarian citizenship. The Act on National Testimony and the introduction of a more active responsibility clause in the Fundamental Law followed. Finally, the Hungarian electoral system was recodified so that the non-resident citizens could have a half-vote in the national elections. Individuals who actively engage in politics, often as members of claim-making organizations within Hungarian minority or diaspora communities, and who could have obtained Hungarian citizenship based on the previously described framework, could now become targets of suspension. By introducing the provision for suspension, these organizations in Serbia, Ukraine or across the global diaspora have been limited in their ability to express values and political views that would align with the ideals of Fidesz. Any opinion that contradicts Fidesz’ view on the sovereignty of the nation-state could, therefore, be labelled as a threat to national security.
In conclusion, citizenship suspension is a measure designed to limit, control, and instil fear in those whose political opinions differ from those of the government. The proposed concept effectively silences the expression of concerns or differing opinions. Once again, the notion of citizenship is being used to serve the political objectives of the Hungarian government.