Christian Fernández (Malmö University)

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Since the refugee reception crisis of 2015, a host of restrictive changes to the Swedish Law on Citizenship (2001:82) have been announced by the current and previous governments. On October 1^st, the first of these changes came into effect (SFS 2024:423). The amendment consists of one change to the terms of citizenship acquisition through declaration for long-term residents under the age of 21 and one change to the conditions of citizenship renunciation for people in vulnerable positions. In this short blog post, I first describe these changes and explain their immediate implications, and secondly, discuss their meaning against the backdrop of recent political developments in Sweden.

Citizenship through declaration

Declaration is a simplified process of acquiring citizenship that applies primarily to residents under age 21 who are stateless, descendants of immigrants or immigrants who came to Sweden as minors. The process differs from naturalization in three important ways: i) the residence requirements are more flexible; ii) the decision is not discretionary but as of right; and iii) the condition of good behaviour does not apply (Law 2001:82, §§ 6-8). The stated purpose of this facilitated procedure is to ensure that minors who grew up in Sweden and/or have no other home than Sweden have an easy and secure path to full legal membership (cf. Bill 1999/2000:147 and Bill 2013/14:143).

The new law introduces a condition of good behaviour for declaration applicants between ages 15 and 21 – unless they are stateless, in which case the old terms still apply. It outlines the following offences as grounds to deny the acquisition of citizenship through declaration (SFS 2024:423): conviction or suspicion of severe criminal offence or repeated criminality in Sweden or abroad, punishable with four years or more in prison according to Swedish law. The good behaviour condition also renders ineligible those applicants perceived as threats to Swedish or general security and people affiliated with groups or organizations that severely abuse other people. Any person who falls under any of these criteria is, from now on, blocked from taking up Swedish citizenship through declaration. Instead, they will have to apply for citizenship through naturalization, where such crimes are penalized with delayed eligibility for citizenship – in some cases up to ten years after time served in prison – or rejection altogether (Swedish Migration Agency 2024).

The new law clearly targets immigrant criminality, especially violent and organised crime, where minors are increasingly used as hitmen, runners, and so on. The new law uses the rules of citizenship (through declaration) as an instrument to make such individuals both more punishable and excludable from Swedish citizenship. Eventually, this may also make them more deportable, as a recent case suggests (cf. Aftonbladet 2024).      

Involuntary citizenship renunciation

The new law also means increased protection against the involuntary renunciation of Swedish citizenship. The revised law states that people in a perceived vulnerable position – e.g. due to the influence of parents, spouses or other family members – may be denied renouncing their Swedish citizenship if there is reason to believe that it is done against the applicant’s own wishes or best interest. The new law requires children from twelve years of age to consent to an application to renounce their citizenship. Children younger than twelve should have the opportunity to express their own opinion before such an application is accepted (SFS 2024:423).

The new law will make it more difficult for parents and guardians to renounce the citizenship of minors. While this applies to all Swedes, it is obvious that the amendment targets the immigrant population and is designed to combat arranged marriages, genital mutilation and other violations of individual rights taking place abroad. Such violations may be facilitated by citizenship renunciation, as stated by the prime minister and migration minister in a recent op-ed (Kristersson and Forssell 2024), because it diminishes the Swedish authorities’ ability to track, reach and intervene on behalf of potential victims.

Discussion

The changes described above reflect a generally restrictive turn in Swedish immigration-integration policy, defined by both tougher instruments (sticks rather than carrots) and tougher demands (deservingness) that are imposed on immigrants and their descendants. This is most obvious for the restriction of the facilitated declaration procedure for citizenship acquisition, while the protection against involuntary renunciation is more ambiguous: stronger protection of individual rights (especially for children and women) from the assumed threat of oppressive, patriarchal immigrant communities. It signals humanitarian concern for vulnerable citizens while highlighting the perceived problems of immigration and the failures of integration.

Immigration-wise, a series of new laws have already been passed since 2015, introducing stricter rules for family reunification, residence permits and a stronger push for repatriation, among other things. Citizenship-wise, most of the changes are still pending. A report commissioned by the previous government of Social Democrats and the Green Party proposes the introduction of both language and civic knowledge tests for Swedish citizenship (SOU 2021:2). Another investigation has been commissioned by the sitting government of Conservatives, Christian Democrats and Liberals, namely to propose stricter rules for naturalization that, in addition to the previous report, include a longer residency requirement (from five to at least eight years), stricter demands on good behaviour and self-sufficiency, and a mandatory oath of allegiance or similar (Gov 5 May 2023). The government is also aiming for a new law that permits unilateral revocation of Swedish citizenship for heavily criminal Swedes with dual citizenship (Kristersson and Forssell 2024) and a much more extensive use of deportations (Gov 2 May 2024).  

These completed and pending changes break down what has long been, according to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), one of the most liberal immigration-integration regimes in the world. The most obvious trigger for this political about-turn was the 2015 refugee reception crisis, which exposed the perceived limitations of Sweden’s reception capacity and the complete failure of the EU’s burden-sharing scheme. Another driver of change is the right-wing populist party, the Sweden Democrats, which has become the second largest in parliament (after the Social Democrats). After years of ostracism by the other parties, the Sweden Democrats are now accepted by the centre-right as an unpleasant but necessary ally. Their influence over the current government, which took office in the fall of 2022, is clearly manifested in immigration-integration policy and the ways in which immigration has become linked to organised crime and questions of law and order. With respect to citizenship, the previous mindset and rhetoric, according to which Swedish citizenship is viewed as a facilitator and encouragement to integration, has been replaced with one in which citizenship is viewed as a reward for successful integration – where success is defined in increasingly demanding terms. 

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The consolidated version of the Swedish Law on Citizenship can be accessed here [in Swedish].

For a comprehensive overview of the history and current legal context of Swedish citizenship, read the GLOBALCIT country report on Sweden.

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References